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I. Introduction  
A class action is a legal action in which a group of people facing 
a similar legal issue combine their cases and thus form a “class.”1 
The class action allows the group of people with similar interests 
to combine their claims in order “to conserve the resources of both 
the courts and the parties,” while at the same time efficiently 
litigating the issues.2 Class actions allow individuals to bring cases 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2017; 
B.A., cum laude Furman University 2014. I would like to thank Professor Joan 
Shaughnessy for her advice and guidance as my note advisor, the 2016–17 
Editorial Board for the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice for their helpful editing suggestions, and my sister Kiersty for listening 
to all of my concerns and sharing her thoughts with me. 
 1. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.1, at 
2 (4th ed. 2002).  
 2. See Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need to 
Know About Class Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 193 (2004) 
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that are not valuable enough to have been brought on their own.3 
In some class actions, one or more persons will seek to bring a suit 
on behalf of a much larger class, and the other members of this 
potential class need to be notified of their involvement in the class.4 
When a class action is formed, named class members are appointed 
as representatives of the entire class.5 They must decide what 
ways they will send notice by creating a notice plan, which must 
be approved by the court.6  
There are several ways to notify people that they may be 
eligible to be in the class.7 With the growth of population and 
technology, parties may seek to send a text message to individuals 
as a way to notify that individual that he or she is potentially able 
to join the class.8 When named class representatives decide to give 
notice to potential class members, one of the multiple ways in 
which they may choose to send notice is to send a text message to 
the individual potential class members.9 The factors that make a 
text message a reasonable form of notice vary, and the Federal 
Judicial Center has proposed changes to the rules that govern 
notice to potential class members.10 
II. History and Purpose of Class Actions 
In the year 1199, in Medieval England, a man named Martin 
was the rector of a local parish.11 The members of his parish were 
                                                                                                     
(describing the nature of class actions and how to resolve them). 
 3. Id. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Theodore Z. Wyman, Sufficiency of Legal Notice Provided by Online 
Publication or Electronic Mail in Class Action Suits, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 103, *5 
(2014) (explaining what notice courts have found proper, including email and 
texts). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 
23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 87 [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT] (Nov. 5–6, 
2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18536/download (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 11. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION 38 (1987).  
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upset with Martin; because of his management of the parish, the 
local parishioners had to carry their dead three miles to the 
“mother church” in a nearby town while still paying Martin for the 
burial.12 The parishioners and Martin could not resolve their 
dispute. Martin then sued the parishioners to collect the offerings 
he felt entitled to and to dispute whether the parishioners were 
entitled to a daily mass.13 The court heard the case, but the 
outcome has been lost to time.14  
What time has not erased, however, is that the court was 
willing to hear the case of Master Martin, Rector of Berkway v. 
Parishioners of Nuthamstead.15 From that fact alone, it is evident 
that the medieval English court recognized that a lawsuit was not 
always between two individuals. The court recognized that the 
parishioners were being represented as a group, and class action 
litigation was able to evolve. 
In a separate incident in 1255, King Henry III wrote a writ to 
the archbishop of Canterbury commanding him to recognize three 
or four men of the village as representative of the whole.16 The 
practice of allowing representative litigation had become “the law 
and condition of the realm.”17 In the writ, King Henry wrote 
“according to the law and custom of the realm . . . villages and 
communities of villeins18 . . . ought to be able to prosecute their 
pleas and complaints in our courts and in those of others through 
three of four of their number.”19 
Class representation carried into the eighteenth century, 
when English courts heard cases brought on behalf of represented 
groups.20 These historical courts understood the equitable purpose 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 48. 
 13. Id. at 38. 
 14. Id. at 48. 
 15. Id. at 47. 
 16. Id. at 97–98. 
 17. Id. at 98. 
 18. A villein is a “person entirely subject to a lord or attached to a manor, 
but free in relation to all others; a serf.” Villein, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
 19. YEAZELL, supra note 11, at 98 (quoting THE COMMUNITY OF THE VILL, IN 
MEDIEVAL STUDIES PRESENTED TO ROSE GRAHAM 1 (V. Ruffer & A.J. Taylor eds., 
Oxford 1950)). 
 20. See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:12 (5th 
ed. 2015) (describing the historical origins of the class action); 7A CHARLES ALAN 
CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW? 283 
of allowing classes to bring their case; “[t]he class action was an 
invention of equity . . . mothered by the practical necessity of 
providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not 
disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from 
enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from 
their equitable wrongs.”21  
A. Early Class Action Jurisprudence in the United States 
In 1853, the Supreme Court approved of class actions in Smith 
v. Swormstedt,22 in which it allowed a representative suit to be 
brought on behalf of all the preachers in the Methodist Episcopal 
Church South; the preachers sought a declaration of the respective 
rights of each sectional group of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
of the United States to funds originally belonging to the entire 
church.23 United States law has evolved to govern the procedural 
aspects of creating and maintaining a class action suit. 
III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) governs when and 
how notice should be provided to potential class members.24 Rule 
23 defines and explains three different types of class actions, and 
how notice requirements differ for each type.25 This note will 
address the Federal Rule, but most States have adopted versions 
of this rule.26 
                                                                                                     
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining 
the history and purpose of the class action). 
 21. WRIGHT, supra note 20 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 
C.C.A., 168 F.2d 182, 187 (1948)). 
 22. 57 U.S. 288 (1853). Smith addresses a different type of class action than 
the type explored in this note, but the example is offered to explore the policy 
behind class actions in the United States. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See NICHOLAS M. PACE, CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 2, 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA__Nation
al_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (describing the evolution of Rule 23). 
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In 1912, Rule 23 read only “When the question is one of 
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class 
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before 
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”27 In the 
decades following, Rule 23 was revised in order to define the 
different categories of class actions.28  
In 1966, the Civil Committee amended Rule 23, and created 
the subcategory of Rule 23(b)(3).29 The (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories 
require that classes be established when the individual claims 
must be combined in the interest of fairness and/or practicality, 
because they are all a result of the same wrongful conduct.30 The 
class members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions cannot opt out of 
the class.31 The new (b)(3) category covered classes so large and 
numerous that individual notice may not be reasonable under the 
circumstances, and explained the ability for potential class 
members to “opt-out” of the class after receiving notice.32 Most 
significantly, it was the first time Rule 23 allowed a class to be 
formed based on individual claims that did not need to be 
adjudicated together; it allowed a binding class action to be formed 
where named class representatives were simply seeking money 
damages for similar conduct. 33 Prior to the 1966 amendments, a 
class action would not have a preclusive effect on similar claims.34 
The purpose of the notice requirement was to justify extending 
the class action judgment to the whole class, while allowing them 
an opportunity to escape the binding judgment.35 Critics of the 
amendment complained that this would encourage a class action 
where notice is not broad enough to actually reach potential class 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (i), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 
(1967) (analyzing the problems with and the effect of the 1966 amendments to 
Rule 23). 
 28. See id. at 375–90 (analyzing the categories of class actions). 
 29. See id. at 389–90 (explaining subdivision (b)(3)). 
 30. See id. at 387–92 (explaining subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 392 (explaining the purpose of notice required by (c)(2)). 
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members.36 Supporters of the rule pointed out that individual 
notice is not practicable in some circumstances, and that the 
Constitution is there to back up Rule 23 in assuring that notice is 
fair.37 
Under the current Rule 23, all types of class actions must first 
meet the requirements of 23(a), which reads:  
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.38 
Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) usually do not require notice to all 
potential class members to satisfy due process, but it is in the 
discretion of the trial judge to determine what notice is required 
under (b)(1) and (b)(2).39 Rule 23(b)(3), however, does require 
adequate notice to potential class members.40 A class may be 
formed under Rule 23(b)(3) if “the court finds that questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”41  
The guidelines for providing notice in a case where the class is 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) are outlined in Rule 23(c)(2).42 In any 
class action maintained under subdivision Rule 23(b)(3), the court 
must order that the members of the class are afforded the best 
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
                                                                                                     
 36. See id. at 395–96 (explaining that the rule faced criticism because it did 
not afford sufficiently intelligible standards and it would not be possible to reach 
all of the class members in all of the cases). 
 37. Id. 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 39. See Rodman Ward Jr. & Wayne N. Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics 
of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C.L. REV. 557, 558 (1969) (discussing the difficulties of fair 
and effective notice and the court’s role in monitoring class actions). 
 40. Id. 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort.43 The notice is required to inform class members on the 
nature of the case, the definition of the certified class, the issues 
and claims at stake, that the court will exclude the potential class 
member from the class if she requests so from the judge within the 
specified time frame, and that the judgment will be binding on 
class members.44 
A. How Potential Class Members Join A Class 
There are two ways in which potential class members become 
part of a class. 45 These two methods are known as “opt-out” and 
“opt-in”.46 
An opt-in class requires each potential class member to take 
affirmative action to join the suit.47 Unlike class actions under 
Rule 23, opt-in classes are statutory and do not concern the same 
due process analysis as opt-out classes. This is because a potential 
class member in an opt-in action does not lose any legal right or 
ability by defecting from the class.48 A potential class member in 
an opt-in case may lose an opportunity to be a part of the class 
action without notice, but they may still bring a suit of their own.49  
In an opt-out class, by contrast, “every member of the class is 
included in the class suit unless they [ask] to be excluded from the 
class.”50 Therefore, when a person is part of a class action, he or 
she is bound by the outcome.51 He or she will lose the right to bring 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability 
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298–304 (2010) (comparing European and 
United States class actions and noting the issues with the system in the United 
States). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 301. 
 48. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9:48 
(5th ed. 2015).  
 49. Id. 
 50. Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and 
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
519, 556 (2003). 
 51. See Coffee, supra note 45 (detailing the legal consequences of joining a 
class action). 
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a new suit on their own behalf.52 This is why, in an opt-out case, it 
is a constitutional and legislative requirement that persons who 
are a part of the class are afforded notice of their involvement.53 
The opt-in model is less popular than the opt-out, as it is only 
allowed by statute.54 The opt-in model is still in use, but no court 
has ever certified an opt-in class action under Rule 23(b)(3).55  
IV. Class Action Basics 
A class action usually begins when one or more persons assert 
that they, and others in a similar situation, are or will be 
damaged.56 The people making the assertion must also explain 
that they represent a larger group of people in a similar situation, 
and therefore become the named class representatives.57 The type 
of damage asserted can vary widely, but includes “product liability, 
medical liability, consumer fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, 
antitrust, securities, insurance, employment, and human rights 
violations.”58 The new class may seek damages, injunctive or 
equitable relief.59 The named class representatives who represent 
the absent members of the class must have standing to bring the 
claim.60 The named class representatives must also be able to 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 298 (explaining the ideology behind class action and that the 
judgment is binding on class members). 
 53. Infra Sections VI, VII. 
 54. Erichson, supra note 50, at 556. 
 55. See Doe v. United States, 44 Fed. App’x 499, 500 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (discussing a class certified by the Court of Federal Claims as an opt-in 
class action); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir. 
2001) (reversing a decertification of an opt-in class action); Katlin v. Tremoglie, 
43 Pa. D. & C.4th 373, 374 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County 1999) (certifying an opt-
in class action); see also CONTE & NEWBERG, § 9:48, supra note 48 (outlining the 
fundamentals of class actions). 
 56. See Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 2 (describing how a class action 
lawsuit begins). In rare circumstances, a defendant may be the certified class. 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21 (2004). 
 57. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 56 (explaining the 
process for getting a class certified). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 61 (detailing burden on named plaintiffs of 
certified classes). 
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fairly represent the class as a whole, rather than putting their own 
interests above those of the entire class.61 The rights of the absent 
class members are protected as a matter of due process, as this 
note will address.62 
In order to proceed as a class action, the persons seeking to 
create a class must have the class approved and certified by the 
court.63 The judge must determine that a precisely defined class 
exists, and that the class representatives are a part of the class.64 
This must be done early in the case.65 In order for the class to be 
approved, the party seeking class certification must meet the 
requirements of Rule 23.66 If the court determines that a class 
action is maintainable under section b(3) of Rule 23, the accepted 
practice is that one or both of the parties prepare a notice plan for 
the court to approve.67 In the notice plan the plaintiff class 
representatives68 will explain what methods they intend to use to 
inform potential class members of their interest in the suit.69 
V. Defining the Parameters of Notice 
Rule 23 is not the only guideline that determines when notice 
is due. In establishing the foundation for notice requirements, this 
note will explore three highly relevant cases from the Supreme 
Court. The first case discussed is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
and Trust Co.70 Mullane does not discuss Rule 23, and does not 
                                                                                                     
 61. 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.13, 
42 (4th ed. 2002).  
 62. Id. at 45. 
 63. See Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 2 (describing the initial steps 
needed for a class action to proceed).  
 64. Id. at 194. 
 65. Id. at 193. 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 67. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., 1 CLASS ACTIONS: IN THE WAKE OF EISEN 
III AND IV 39–40 (1976). 
 68. Occasionally, this may be the defendant. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra note 56 (explaining the process of certifying a class action).  
 69. See 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
§1797.6 (3d ed. 2012) (describing the methods by which notice may be ordered). 
 70. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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involve a class action.71 However, the case creates the standard for 
what notice is required under the due process clause of the 
constitution.72 The next case is Phillips Petroleum Company v. 
Shutts,73 which addresses when notice must be sent to potential 
class members under due process.74 The last major Supreme Court 
case this note will analyze is Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin.75 
Eisen explains how to read the notice requirements of Rule 23, and 
clarifies that the notice requirements of Rule 23 are more rigid 
than Mullane and, therefore, more rigid than the constitution.76  
VI. Constitutional Requirements of Due Process in Notice 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
dictate that United States Citizens may not have their life, liberty 
or property taken from them without due process.77 These 
amendments require that a citizen must have a fair trial before the 
government may deprive them of their life, liberty, or property.78  
A. Mullane 
The Supreme Court in Mullane explained: “Many 
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of 
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a 
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property 
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing.”79  
                                                                                                     
 71. See generally id. 
 72. See id. at 315 (requiring that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 
 73. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 74. Id. at 803. 
 75. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 76. See id. (concluding that Rule 23 requires more of notice than the 
Constitution).  
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VIV. 
 78. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 79. Id. (emphasis added).     
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In Mullane, 113 private small trusts were pooled into a 
common trust fund at Central Hanover Bank in New York.80 There 
was testimony at the trial that there were about 350 current 
beneficiaries, and up to 2,000 persons with relevant interests.81 
This case was not brought under a class action theory, however the 
case still addressed what notice was proper to satisfy due process.82 
A New York statute required banks to follow a specific plan of 
notice by publication when deciding to settle the accounts in the 
common fund.83 The statute required one type of notice, and only 
one type of notice, regardless of whether the beneficiaries were 
identifiable.84 The bank was required to publish notice in a 
newspaper at least once a week for four weeks, and there was no 
requirement for individual notice.85 The bank complied, and the 
only notice that it gave was “by newspaper publication setting 
forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name 
and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list 
of all participating estates, trusts or funds.”86 The appellant87 then 
objected to the statutory notice requirements, and the actual notice 
given, on the grounds that the notice was insufficient and therefore 
it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88  
The landmark Mullane decision explained that the 
fundamental constitutional requirements of notice are satisfied 
when “notice [is] reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”89 The court explained that notice must reasonably 
“convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 309. 
 81. John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common Trust 
Funds, and the Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1963, 1698 n.17 (2015). 
 82. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 310. 
 86. Id.  
 87. The appellant in this case was a statutorily appointed guardian ad litem 
who was responsible for representing the interests of all of the trust beneficiaries. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 311. 
 89. Id. at 314 (citations omitted). 
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time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due 
regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these 
conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are 
satisfied.”90 
The court also emphasized that notice could not be a “mere 
gesture”.91 It reasoned that due process requires that “[t]he means 
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The 
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen 
method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself 
reasonably certain to inform those affected.”92 The court explained 
that when it is not reasonable to send notice under these 
conditions, the chosen method of notice must not be substantially 
less likely to give notice than any other “feasible and customary” 
method.93 The court in Mullane ultimately decided that, in this 
case, publication by newspaper was insufficient to accord due 
process.94 The court explained:  
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed 
here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the 
fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident 
that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the 
question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions 
founded on process constructively served through local 
newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local 
resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back 
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area 
of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the 
information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance 
of actual notice is further reduced when as here the notice 
required does not even name those whose attention it is 
supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who 
might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis 
of equivalence with actual notice we are unable to regard this 
as more than a feint.95  
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 314–15. 
 91. Id. at 315. 
 92. Id.   
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
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However, the court did not intend to say that the bank had to 
ascertain the names and addresses of all beneficiaries involved. 
The bank was only required to provide notice to current trust 
beneficiaries of known place and residence.96 The court explained 
that, as to those beneficiaries whose information could not be 
ascertained with “due diligence,” the New York Statute’s required 
notice was sufficient.97 The court also explained that, even if the 
beneficiaries could be ascertained with “due diligence” the bank 
wasn’t required to do any investigating to discover the information 
for beneficiaries.98 The bank was not required to obtain 
information outside of its normal course of business because 
requiring the bank to stay informed of this information would 
impose a severe burden.99 The New York statutory notice was 
ruled “inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, 
but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably 
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other 
means at hand.”100 
B. Phillips Petroleum 
A class action is a unique situation in which the named 
representatives in the class are representing the interests of third 
parties who are not present.101 Phillips addressed the personal 
jurisdiction issues in a class action where potential class members 
are not present.102 Phillips involved a multi-state class action suit 
brought by royalty owners against Phillips Petroleum Company for 
withholding interest payments on royalties.103 This suit was 
brought in Kansas state court and the defendant opposed class 
certification on the ground that the Kansas court could not 
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the vast 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 317. 
 97. Id.  
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 99. Id. at 317–18. 
 100. Id. at 319. 
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 102. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985). 
 103. Id. at 799.  
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majority of the absent class members who lacked minimum 
contacts with Kansas.104 The Supreme Court explained:  
Petitioner claims that failure to execute and return the “request 
for exclusion” provided with the class notice cannot constitute 
consent of the out-of-state plaintiffs; thus Kansas courts may 
exercise jurisdiction over these plaintiffs only if the plaintiffs 
possess the sufficient “minimum contacts” with Kansas as that 
term is used regarding out-of-state defendants in personal 
jurisdiction cases.105  
Although the Phillips court “recognized that class plaintiffs were 
in danger of losing the property interests represented by their 
claims, it reasoned that they were unlikely to be subjected to 
judgments against them, or to other significant burdens such as 
discovery, costs, or attorneys’ fees.” 106 
The court rejected both a “minimum contacts” test in class 
actions and a requirement that a person “opt-in” in order to join 
the class.107 It explained that the jurisdictional issues are satisfied 
if procedural due process protections are provided.108 The Phillips 
court explained that the function of notice is to allow potential 
class members a fair chance of excusing themselves from the 
class.109 It explained: “[T]he interests of the absent plaintiffs are 
sufficiently protected by the forum State when those plaintiffs are 
provided with a request for exclusion that can be returned within 
a reasonable time to the court.”110 In general, the Court 
emphasized that an opt-out opportunity is an important 
component of due process in damage class actions.111 
                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 806. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 
11–12 (1986). 
 107. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 808, 812 (“We reject petitioner's contention that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent 
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 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 814. 
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C. Eisen 
The petitioner in Eisen originally brought his suit on behalf of 
all buyers and sellers of “odd lots” on the stock market exchange, 
alleging that the respondent brokerage firms had violated the 
Sherman Act when they monopolized the trade and set the 
differential too high and that the exchange itself violated the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when it failed to protect the 
investors.112 The petitioner’s class was later limited to investors 
who had traded in odd lots between May 1, 1962 and June 30, 
1966.113 The case was juggled between the district and appellate 
courts in New York three times, and the third time the District 
Court heard the case it ruled on the issue of notice.114 The District 
Court found that the prospective class included six million 
individuals and institutions, and “with reasonable effort some two 
million of these odd-lot investors could be identified by name and 
address; and that the names and addresses of an additional 
250,000 persons who had participated in special investment 
programs . . . could also be identified with reasonable effort.”115 
The court explained that using the first-class rate of postage, it 
would cost $225,000 to provide individual notice to all identifiable 
class members, plus additional expenses for notice by publication 
to reach the other four million potential class members.116 
In the appellate case preceding the third District Court case, 
petitioner had argued that that mailing notice to each identifiable 
plaintiff would be so expensive he would have to drop his case, and 
asked for permission to provide notice by publication instead.117 
Petitioner’s monetary interest in the suit was only seventy dollars, 
so the suit had to be a class action or no lawyer would pursue the 
case.118 The Supreme Court heard the case after it was reviewed 
by the Court of Appeals a third time.119 The Supreme Court 
emphasized that under Rule 23(c) individual notice must be 
                                                                                                     
 112. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 160 (1974). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 166–67. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 165. 
 118. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974).  
 119. Id. at 169. 
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provided to class members who are identifiable through reasonable 
effort.120 The Supreme Court explained that in the Eisen case, the 
names and addresses of 2,250,000 class members were easily 
ascertainable, and there was no showing that individual notice 
could not be mailed to every identifiable class member.121 It also 
emphasized that individual notice, when possible through 
reasonable effort, is not something to be discretionarily waived; it 
is an unambiguous requirement under Rule 23(c).122 It explained 
that individual notice requirements may not be tailored to fit the 
“pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs,” and that petitioner must 
bear the cost of providing notice.123 
VII. Best Notice Practicable and Reasonable Effort Under Rule 23  
Mullane helped clarify what is proper notice under the due 
process clause, but courts have not had rigid guidelines when 
deciding what constitutes the best notice practicable under Rule 
23.124 Court decisions evaluating notice plans depend on various 
elements in the factual situation, including the size of the class and 
“whether the class members can be identified easily (for example, 
by stockholder lists, computer printouts of customers, or any other 
form of record accessible to the class representative), and the 
probability that publication notice, if used, would or would not 
reach its intended audience”125  
Some courts have found a combination of individual notice and 
publication notice to be the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances.126 “This alternative has often been ordered by 
courts where some members of the class could be identified by a 
reasonable method, such as customer or stockholder lists, but other 
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 175. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. See Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, What Constitutes “Best Notice 
Practicable,” Required by Rule 23(c)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
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class members could not be identified, for example, transferees of 
stock where no transfer lists were kept .”127 “Some courts have 
ruled that Rule 23 allows the use of publication notice when used 
in combination with individual notice, “when the notice can be 
published where it is likely to be seen and read by the 
unidentifiable class members. Under certain circumstances, 
however, it has been held that individual notice combined with 
publication notice for unidentifiable class members was not the 
best practicable method of notice.”128 
There is no defined way to make a “reasonable effort” to 
provide notice under Rule 23.129 Individual notice to all class 
members has been required in cases where parties have access to 
lists of class members available from corporations, transfer agents, 
or broker firms.130 In some class actions brought under Rule 23(b) 
the notice plan has requested to have notice sent in the defendant’s 
monthly statement, billing, or similar mailing, in order to save 
costs.131 Courts have sometimes rejected this approach, because 
these lists can be over or under inclusive depending on when the 
lists were created and updated.132 
Courts have sometimes allowed publication notice, through 
mediums including newspapers and media outlets, to be sufficient 
on its own when class members could not be reasonably identified 
and contacted, or could not be identified at all.133 However, 
publication notice alone has been held not sufficient where 
members of the class were readily identifiable.134 It is not entirely 
clear when publication notice is sufficient alone, but the Supreme 
Court in Eisen explained that when a reasonable effort under Rule 
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 128. Id.  
 129. See id. (demonstrating multiple methods of notice). 
 130. See Robeson, supra note 124, at § 2 (providing examples of when 
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23(c) makes individual notice possible, there is no substitute for 
individual notice.135  
A. Reasonable Notice Plans in Class Actions 
When a plaintiff is seeking a class action, they must, among 
other things, present a plan to the court detailing how they intend 
to provide notice to potential class members.136 There is no one 
right way to create a notice plan.137 Notice plans may indicate an 
intention to provide notice to potential class members through a 
variety of mediums, including cell phones.138  
The Federal Judicial Center created a Notice Plan checklist in 
2010 for judges to use as they evaluate notice plans.139 The 
checklist provides questions for the judges to consider, including 
“Is the notice plan conducive to reaching the demographics of the 
class?”, “Is the coverage broad and fair? Does the plan account for 
mobility?”, and “Does the plan include individual notice?”140 
Although this checklist provides some direction to judges, the 
process of approving a notice plan is still largely in the discretion 
of each individual judge.141 
B. Courts Differ on Appropriate Methods of Notice 
District Courts have not had much occasion to discuss whether 
text messages are an appropriate form of notice in particular 
circumstances. The small number of District Courts that have 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175–76 (1974) 
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expressed an opinion in the matter have not consistently approved 
or disapproved of notice through text messages; their reactions 
have been mixed.142  
1. Disapproval of Text Messages 
In Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores,143 Jermyn successfully created 
a class action to sue Best Buy for failing to meet their price match 
guarantee.144 His class consisted of  
All New York citizens and residents who, from January 10, 2002 
until the present, made a purchase at Best Buy and within 30 
days (14 days for computers, monitors, notebook computers, 
printers, camcorders, digital cameras and radar detectors) after 
the purchase found a lower price from an entity qualifying 
under Best Buy’s published price match guarantee on an 
available product of the same brand and model, provided 
verification of the lower price to Best Buy and were denied the 
benefit of Best Buy’s price match guarantee.145  
Jermyn’s notice plan sought to alert individuals to their class 
eligibility through, among other mediums, a post on twitter, 
individual [text] messages, and email.146 Best Buy objected to the 
use of all three of these methods.147 The court agreed with Best 
Buy, explaining that “[I]ndividual notice is impossible because 
neither Best Buy nor Jermyn has any way of identifying customers 
who unsuccessfully sought a price match under Best Buy’s price-
                                                                                                     
 142. Compare Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 00214 (CM), 2010 
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match guarantee; Best Buy does not maintain a list of such 
customers.”148 The court explained that there is an alternative, 
“[I]n situations . . . where class members cannot be identified for 
purposes of sending individual notice, notice by publication is 
sufficient.”149 The court explained that a twitter post was not 
appropriate because it reached a group of people much larger than 
the potential class, and research suggested that most of the visitors 
to the twitter page went there for technical support.150 The court 
explained that there were two major downsides to posting on 
twitter, “first, notice cannot be limited to Best Buy customers in 
New York, and the class here is comprised solely of New York 
residents. Second, there is no way to assure that notice via Twitter 
will result in notice to even a single class member, let alone a 
substantial number of class members.”151 The court then explained 
that [text] messages were inappropriate for similar reasons as a 
twitter post; the list of telephone numbers held by Best Buy 
included members who were excluded from the class (Best Buy 
Employees and members of Best Buy’s Loyalty Program).152 The 
court explained “Although Best Buy may be able to restrict its text 
messages to New York customers, there is no link between the list 
of mobile telephone numbers (which includes individuals excluded 
from the class definition) and class members.”153 The court also 
reasoned that the list of mobile telephone numbers was even more 
flawed than a twitter post, because the list was under-inclusive as 
it contained only a select group of possible customers.154 
                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at *4. 
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2. Approval of Text Messages 
A District Court in Illinois approved a notice plan allowing 
notice by text message.155 In the case of In re AT& T Mobility 
Wireless Data,156 the plaintiffs and AT&T agreed on a settlement 
after the plaintiffs accused AT&T of breaking the law by charging 
internet taxes.157 Fifty-seven plaintiffs and AT&T filed a joint 
motion to certify the class for settlement purposes, and it was 
granted. The court also approved the notice plan and said it 
satisfied Rule 23.158 The notice plan indicated that AT&T would 
send both a message with each customer’s monthly bill and a text 
message to its current customers. Former customers would receive 
notice via email, if they had provided an email address to AT&T, 
or by U.S. Mail otherwise.159 Several class members objected to the 
settlement, and many of the objectors complained that the notice 
was inadequate.160 Dr. Florence had served as the interim 
settlement administrator, held a P.H.D. in research and statistics, 
and testified at the hearing about the notice plan.161 He explained 
how he examined AT&T’s data with them in order to devise a 
notice plan.162 The notice plan that the parties had created 
provided multiple types of notice, including inserts into current 
customers’ bills, text messages, publication, and email.163 AT&T 
sent notice by text message to more than 32-million class members 
who were customers as of September 14, 2010.164 Several of the 
objecting class members complained that the text messages were 
under-inclusive, but the court explained “[t]hese objections are 
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misplaced. Due process does not require that every class member 
receive notice.”165 
Another case in which a court reviewed a part of a notice plan 
was In re Penthouse Executive Club.166 The matter was originally 
brought to court when entertainers/dancers from the Penthouse 
Executive Club sued, alleging that they were wrongfully classified 
as private contractors and the Club used that as an excuse to extort 
fees and tips from them.167 The settlement class consisted of “all 
individuals who perform or performed at the Penthouse Executive 
Club as entertainers from on or about January 1, 2004 through 
June 12, 2012, including any individual who has signed an 
‘Entertainer License Agreement’ or any other agreement 
containing a class or collective action waiver.”168 The notice plan 
included notice “sent by first-class mail to each respective Class 
Member at his or her last known address . . . . provided on 
www.stripperweb.com . . . and two text messages [were sent] to 
Class Members on August 9, 2013 and September 10, 2013,” and a 
settlement website was created.169 The court did not analyze why 
text messages were appropriate, nor did the court describe how the 
phone numbers of approximately 1,230 class members were 
obtained, but the court allowed the notice.170 It is evident from this 
that the parties were able to reasonably obtain these numbers and 
the class action was still financially viable. 
Another case in which the court approved of text messages as 
a form of notice was Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp.171 This 
case addressed whether the class could be certified as a collective 
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.172 The plaintiffs 
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alleged that, working under the defendants in fast food 
restaurants in New York, they were denied minimum wage, 
overtime, and uniforms, and the deducted unauthorized tips from 
their employees.173 The plaintiffs’ notice plan included direct mail, 
a workplace posting at the offending restaurant’s location, and a 
text message. The parties agreed that the notice should be 
distributed in both Thai and English, but the restaurant did not 
agree that a workplace posting and text messages were 
appropriate forms of notice.174 The plaintiffs argued that text 
messages were appropriate because many of the restaurant 
employees were transient and potential class members had 
changed residences since beginning work at the restaurant.175 The 
restaurant opposed the text messages, alleging that the plaintiffs 
could not demonstrate that notification via text message was 
appropriate “in light of individuals’ privacy interests in their 
cellular phone numbers and the ease with which individuals may 
distort electronic data.”176 The court found that, “given the high 
turnover in the restaurant industry,” notice by text message was 
appropriate.177 The court also noted that the restaurant primarily 
communicated with their employees through text messages, and 
therefore their objection to text messages based on privacy 
interests held very little weight.178 
VIII. When is a Text Message a Reasonable Form of Notice? 
A. It is Likely to Reach the Potential Class Members 
As the relevant cases above illustrate, determining whether 
text messages are an appropriate form of notice is a very fact-
intensive process.179 It is safe to say, however, that when providing 
notice to potential class action plaintiffs, the best notice is 
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individual notice.180 The Supreme Court has explained “individual 
notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary 
consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an 
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23 . . . . Accordingly, each class 
member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be 
notified . . . . ”181 If most individuals in the United States own a cell 
phone that they use regularly, it follows that text messages sent to 
cell phones may be one of the best ways to provide individual 
notice.  
1. Likelihood of an Individual Owning a Cell Phone in the 
United States 
The amount of United States citizens with cell phones could 
have a large impact on a fact-based analysis of a notice plan. A 
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2013 found that 
over ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone.182 This 
percentage remained steady through July of 2015.183 Additionally, 
sixty-four percent of adults own a smart phone.184 Americans are 
downloading smart phone applications en masse; “Apple reported 
earlier this year that twenty five billion applications had been 
downloaded on its iOS platform to date; Google estimated twenty 
billion had been downloaded on the Android platform.”185 If the 
named class representatives can reasonably access data collected 
by cell phone companies, or application databases, it would be 
reasonable to require that the named class representatives acquire 
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the phone numbers of potential class members in order to provide 
individual notice to them. While smart phones have multiple 
capabilities, such as receiving email and checking the internet, 
text messages may be the most likely way to provide individual 
notice. A 2013 Pew Research Study showed that eighty-one percent 
of people use their cell phones to check their messages, while only 
sixty percent use them to access the internet and only fifty-two 
percent use their phones to check their email.186 
2. It is an Efficient Method of Communicating with Potential 
Class Members 
One of the factors that courts consider when evaluating 
whether a notice plan is reasonable is its efficiency.187 When the 
current version of Rule 23 was created in 1966, the Advisory 
Committee explained that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions were meant 
to include “cases in which a class action would achieve economies 
of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as 
to persons similarly situated.”188 The Mullane case explained that 
some methods of notice may increase in efficiency as time 
progresses, specifically explaining that notice by mail is considered 
efficient.189 Therefore, as new methods become more efficient, they 
are more reasonable. Another Supreme Court case, Mennonite 
Board of Missions v. Adams,190 explained that the use of “less 
reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, ‘an 
inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is 
available.’”191 In some cases, potential class members’ cell phone 
                                                                                                     
 186. Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/19/cell-phone-activities-2013/ (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 187. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (“[C]ontinued 
exclusive reliance on an ineffective means of service is not notice ‘reasonably 
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.’”). 
 188. D. Rhett Brandon, Notice Cost Problems Under Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) 
After Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 1979 DUKE L.J. 882, 883 (1979). 
 189. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) 
(“However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as 
an efficient and inexpensive means of communication.”). 
 190. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
 191. Id. at 799 (quoting Greene, 456 U.S. at 455). 
CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW? 305 
numbers may be easy to acquire.192 Depending on the individual 
circumstances, text messages can be much cheaper than spending 
millions on mass publication campaigns.193 It may also be the best 
method of providing individual notice. The cost of obtaining the 
data necessary for sending notice through a text message will vary 
widely depending on the case. The exact cost of sending a text 
message to each potential class member is less important than the 
ratio of what the notice costs are as compared to the amount each 
class member stands to gain in a money damages case.194 
IX. When is a Text Message an Unreasonable Form of Notice? 
A. Phone Number Data is Available but too Broad to be 
Reasonable 
In some cases, it will not be easy to collect data of potential 
class action members. For example, in Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores 
the proposed potential notice plan required Best Buy to inform its 
New York customers of the ongoing suit.195 However, Best Buy was 
unable to restrict the customer phone number list to include only 
the potential class members.196 The list of phone numbers included 
employees of the store, and they were not eligible to be a part of 
the class.197 The court found that texting all of the customers 
without restricting the texts to only class members violated Rule 
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23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that notice plans 
should not be over inclusive.198 
The argument against over-inclusiveness does not carry very 
much weight, however. Notice by publication is necessarily 
overbroad. Any person reading the newspaper may come across a 
notice publication. Additionally, it seems to be an argument arising 
outside of law. The primary concern of providing notice is to ensure 
people are not deprived of their rights; the fact that some people 
may be notified unnecessarily does not seem important enough to 
risk depriving a person of their rights.199 
B. Class Members are Likely to Be Impoverished 
It may also be unreasonable to send text messages to potential 
class members when potential class members are likely to be 
impoverished and therefore without cellphones.200 There is a large 
gap in living standards between the poor and the severely poor.201 
Although twenty-five percent of technically poor households in the 
United States own a cell phone, ten percent of poor families have 
no telephone access at all.202 If a potential class is likely to be 
significantly composed of the poorest of America’s poor, it is 
probably not wise to attempt to reach them by text message. 
C. A Text Message is too Unofficial as a Form of Notice 
In the Federal Judicial Center checklist for notice plans, the 
form asks “Will e‐mailed notice be used instead of postal 
mailings?”203 The checklist provides a paragraph of explanation 
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under each question, and under that particular question it 
cautions:  
If available, parties should use postal mailing addresses, which 
are generally more effective than e-mail in reaching class 
members: mail-forwarding services reach movers, and the 
influx of “SPAM” e-mail messages can cause valid e-mails to go 
unread. If e-mail will be used—e.g., to active e-mail addresses 
the defendant currently uses to communicate with class 
members—be careful to require sophisticated design of the 
subject line, the sender, and the body of the message, to 
overcome SPAM filters and ensure readership.204 
Unfamiliar text messages can give rise to some of the same 
fears.205 People receiving text messages about class actions may 
think they are the victim of a phone scam.206 This fear is not 
unfounded. Spam text messages are on the rise.207 However, efforts 
are being made to restrict mobile text messaging scams. The 2003 
Can Spam Act and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act made 
mobile spam illegal.208 Smartphone users can report mobile spam 
to the Federal Communications Commission through the 
government website.209 The major wireless carriers, AT&T, Sprint, 
T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless and Bell Mobility all offer ways to 
report spam phone numbers.210 
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The technology for combatting spam text messages has been 
in place since 2012.211 Cell phone providers collect phone numbers 
associated with the spam and report them to a shared database.212 
Additionally, spam e-mail is at a twelve-year low213, and this trend 
may continue with cell phones as consumers report more spam text 
messages. 
X. Text Messages May Become a More Reasonable Form of Notice 
A. Cell Phones Will Grow in Popularity 
Cell phones are growing in popularity, and are considered to 
be necessities rather than luxuries.214 As we move forward with 
technology and more people gain access to cell phones, this could 
be a very affordable, practical and effective way to reach potential 
plaintiffs in a class action. Poor families are starting to rely on cell 
phones for internet access.215 As internet becomes more crucial to 
everyday life, we can expect to see more families with cell phones.  
B. Text Messages May Be an Improvement to Postal Mail 
The Mullane case explained that notice should be provided by 
the best means possible; “Where the names and post office 
addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the 
reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to 
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apprise them of its pendency.”216 The central motivation behind 
the court’s ruling in Mullane was to make parties in a class action 
case use the method of notice that was most likely to reach the 
class members; Mullane explained: 
The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any 
chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself 
reasonably certain to inform those affected or, where conditions 
do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is 
not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of 
the feasible and customary substitutes.217 
Comparing the levels of homelessness and persons without 
addresses to the levels of people without cell phones today shows 
an inverse trend.218 The principle behind Mullane’s reasoning is 
that the notice should be able to reach the intended persons by 
method most likely to reach a person. In cases where potential 
class members are likely to be homeless, it follows that text 
messages may become more likely to reach potential class 
members than the traditional method of paper mail. 
XI. Proposed Rule 23 Changes 
The Rule 23 subcommittee has been actively discussing 
changes to the rule since late 2014.219 The subcommittee has 
recommended changes to Rule 23 (b)(3) as follows:  
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice [by the most 
appropriate means, including first class mail, electronic, or other 
means] {by first class mail, electronic mail, or other appropriate 
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means} to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort.220 
The notes to the proposed change explain that paper mail is 
no longer the “gold standard.”221 The committee explains that, 
following Eisen’s interpretation of individual notice requirements 
for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, many courts have determined that 
first class mail is necessary in every case.222 They go on to explain 
that technological changes have provided methods of 
communication that are more commonly used by many people.223 
The committee explains: 
As that technological change has evolved, courts and counsel 
have begun to employ new technology to make notice more 
effective, and sometimes less costly. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) is amended 
to take account of these changes, and to call attention to them. 
No longer should courts assume that first class mail is the ‘gold 
standard’ for notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. As amended, 
the rule calls for giving notice ‘by the most appropriate means.’ 
It does not specify any particular means as preferred. Although 
it may often be true that online methods of notice, for example 
by email, are the most promising, it is important to keep in mind 
that a significant portion of class members in certain cases may 
have limited or no access to the Internet.224 
The proposed rule change alludes that there are other means for 
potential class members to receive notice, rather than the 
traditional method of paper mail. The committee’s notes on the 
proposed rule change do not specifically suggest text messages as 
a form of notice, but they certainly open the door for the discussion.  
XII. Conclusion 
In every situation involving a notice plan, the reasonableness 
of sending a text message as a form of notice is very fact specific.225 
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With the ever-growing popularity of cell phones, it seems that text 
messages are more and more likely to be the best way to provide 
individual notice.226 Potential class members may have moved, or 
their address is simply too costly to obtain. If it is efficient and 
reasonable to obtain the phone numbers of potential class 
members, it is the best way to provide individual notice. 
 I recommend that the subcommittee adopts the revised Rule 
23. The Rule 23 Committee notes that sometimes electronic 
notification can be more efficient.227 Text messages may be, in 
some cases, the most efficient and most reliable way to provide 
individual notice to people. The small amount of applicable case 
law leans in favor of accepting text messages as part of a notice 
plan,228and the trend in cell phone use in the United States 
suggests that most people have, or will soon have, access to text 
messages.229 The proposed rule will encourage judges to accept text 
messages as part of a notice plan more readily, and the rule will 
provide clarity to parties when they are creating a notice plan. The 
proposed rule is a reflection of the law adapting to modern 
technology, and it is a necessary adaption. 
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